Last week, a Bloomberg journalist interviewed Maduro and the two leaders of the opposition, Henrique Capriles and Juan Guaido. Ahead of the negotiations monitored by the Kingdom of Norway the three parties, that are finalizing the agenda, have different expectations. The opposition is divided, with Capriles arguing that a compromise with Maduro is needed to rescue Venezuela from its desperate situation. Capriles is also against the sanctions as they have resulted in a humanitarian crisis for the Venezuelan people, he said sanctions shouldn't affect the people who lives in Venezuela and it's not Maduro who is currently affected by the sanctions. Moreover, he thinks the opposition should go back to the path of elections with the November 2021 regional elections. On the other hand, Guaido defended the use of sanctions, as sanctions would be the only powerful tool available to weaken the "dictator" and even if the sanctions did not produce the desired effect, Guaido said that sanctions must be improved. Guaido wants to force a negotiation as he thinks Maduro will not voluntarily agree to a political agreement that will generate its departure from the government, because its objective is to maintain power at all costs. On the other hand, for Capriles, the election of Joe Biden and the end of the Trump administration have changed the rules and now a comprehensive negotiation process would be possible. He reiterated that he has "nothing to do with the interim-government" and criticized its raison d'etre. Maduro has radically opposed expectations for the negotiations to those of Guaido. Guaido is offering a progressive lifting of the sanctions in favor of a "free and fair elections", while Maduro wants the sanctions to be removed and invites the opposition to participate in the November 2021 regional elections. Maduro said formal invitations have been sent to the international community to observe the elections and added the conditions for a fair election will be met. Because of sanctions no single drop of oil has been sold for 14 months, according to Maduro, and the production went down from 2.5m bpd in 2015 to less than 500k bpd now. However with the anti-blockade law, Maduro is trying to attract foreign investments to revive the economy. The law would set the legal frameworks for partnerships between private investors and the government, however Maduro has been discrete on the topic because he doesn't want OFAC to chase investors but disclosed that his administration would be in touch with more than 300 investors who have a circa $25bn investment capacity. To sum up these interviews, there were 3 different tones with two radical opposites and Capriles who is more in between. While Guaido remains on the same line which is to negotiate Maduro's departure from power, after failed negotiations in 2017 in the Dominican Republic and 2019 in Norway, the end of the Trump administration has given hope to Maduro and Capriles that a dialogue can be reinstated among the Maduro regime and the US together with the opposition. A question has been addressed by the journalist to Maduro with regards to the restructuring of the debt. The Venezuelan president said the sanctions make it impossible for Venezuela to pay creditors in dollars as no banks would allow the payment to proceed. He also said that his administration has already put together a restructuring plan but, when asked by the Bloomberg journalist, he didn't disclose any discount on the debt. None of the three parties disclosed if they would be candidate to the 2024 presidential elections |
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Credit | Type / ISIN | Indicative price (%)* |
Venezuela | VENZ 13 5/8 08/15/18 | 10 | 11 |
Venezuela | VENZ 9 ¼ 09/15/27 | 10 | 11 |
Venezuela | VENZ 7 3/4 10/13/19 | 9.5 | 10.5 |
Venezuela | VENZ 6 12/09/20 | 9.5 | 10.5 |
Venezuela | VENZ 12 3/4 08/23/22 | 10 | 11 |
Venezuela | VENZ 9 05/07/23 | 9.5 | 10.5 |
Venezuela | VENZ 8 1/4 10/13/24 | 9.5 | 10.5 |
Venezuela | VENZ 7.65 04/21/25 | 9.5 | 10.5 |
Venezuela | VENZ 11 3/4 10/21/26 | 10 | 11 |
Venezuela | VENZ 9 1/4 05/07/28 | 9.5 | 10.5 |
Venezuela | VENZ 11.95 08/05/31 | 10 | 11 |
Venezuela | VENZ 9 3/8 01/13/34 | 9.5 | 10.5 |
Venezuela | VENZ 7 03/31/38 | 9.5 | 10.5 |
Venezuela | ICSID Claims | Call desk for Prices |
PDVSA | PDVSA 8 1/2 10/27/20 | 25 | 28 |
PDVSA | PDVSA 9 11/17/21 | 4.5 | 5.5 |
PDVSA | PDVSA 12 3/4 02/17/22 | 4.5 | 5.5 |
PDVSA | PDVSA 6 10/28/22 | 4.5 | 5.5 |
PDVSA | PDVSA 6 05/16/24 | 4.5 | 5.5 |
PDVSA | PDVSA 6 11/15/26 | 4.5 | 5.5 |
PDVSA | PDVSA 5 3/8 04/12/27 | 4.5 | 5.5 |
PDVSA | PDVSA 9 3/4 05/17/35 | 4.5 | 5.5 |
PDVSA | PDVSA 5 1/2 04/12/37 | 4.5 | 5.5 |
PDVSA | Promissory Notes | Call desk for Prices |
PDVSA | Trade Receivables | Call desk for Prices |
* Indicative price for positions with institutional size only. For smaller sizes please call desk
Last week, International Monetary Fund privately estimated that any deal with Argentina will be pushed into 2022 as President Fernández has little incentive to quickly agree a new financing programme, the Buenos Aires Times reported. While the IMF has said it’s constructively engaging with Fernández’s administration, negotiations entailing fiscal austerity aren’t expected to make much progress before Argentina’s midterm elections in November, said five people familiar with the talks, asking not to be identified because discussions are private, the article said. Pressure on Argentina for a faster deal has also eased as the government will likely have enough money to cover $4.58bn in principal and interest payments due to the Fund later this year. It expects to receive $4.4bn in IMF reserves in August, as part of a global injection of funds to fight the economic impact of the pandemic, and has also seen larger-than-expected dollar revenue due to rising prices of soybeans, a top export product. The Province of Buenos Aires extended again the deadline for its bonds exchange offer until 2nd July. The Province and the bondholders committee failed to reach an agreement so far, some bondholders filed a claim in US court after negotiations failed to improve. |
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Credit | Type / ISIN | Indicative price (%)* | Argentina | ARGENT 0 1/8 07/09/30 | 37.8 | 39.4 | Argentina | ARGENT 8.28 12/31/33 | 47.1 | 56.5 | Argentina | ARGENT 7 1/8 06/28/17 | 40.7 | 44.6 | Argentina | ARGENT 3 3/4 12/31/38 | 38.3 | 47.7 | Argentina | ARGENT 5 7/8 01/11/28 | 39.3 | 49 | Argentina | ARGENT 1 07/09/29 | 39.6 | 41.2 | Argentina | ARGENT 3.38 12/31/38 | 38.5 | 43.7 | Argentina | ARGENT 7 1/2 04/22/26 | 45.5 | 49 | Argentina | ARGENT 6 7/8 04/22/21 | 47.9 | 49.5 | Argentina | ARGENT 7.82 12/31/33 | 42.6 | 49.5 | Argentina | ARGENT 5 5/8 01/26/22 | 42.2 | 48.5 | Argentina | ARGENT 0 1/8 07/09/35 | 33.5 | 34.2 | Argentina | ARGENT 6 7/8 01/26/27 | 42.1 | 45.9 | Argentina | ARGENT 6 7/8 01/11/48 | 42.1 | 47.1 | Argentina | ARGENT 0 1/8 07/09/41 | 37.5 | 37.7 | Argentina | ARGENT 0 1/8 01/09/38 | 39.4 | 40.1 | Argentina | ARGENT 0 1/8 07/09/46 | 33.5 | 34.5 | Argentina | ARGENT 4 5/8 01/11/23 | 42 | 51.3 |
* Indicative price for positions with institutional size only. For smaller sizes please call desk |
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